Wong on Family Law

Select topics on Family Law in Australia -- Some Definitions

Work-in-progress, 31 May 2025 (last updated)

NOTE: From 10 June 2025, amendments to the Family Law Act 1975: Family Law Amendment Act 2024 (Cth): <https://www.legislation.gov.au/C2024A00118/asmade/text>. 

[A-A] Coercion or Coercive Control (in parenting context, and Family Law Act context): 

• "In Friseal & Friseal [2025] FedCFamC2F 75 (“Friseal”), I discussed the meaning of coercion or control and how it may, depending on the circumstances, constitute family violence. I provided a summary of relevant legal principle as to the meaning of coercion or control. At [27] of my reasons, I stated: The notion of command or dominating influence, whether by physical or verbal means, that causes another to comply, act or agree contrary to their own will is at the core of coercion or control and amounts to family violence under the Act. Compliance that occurs due to ambivalence, acquiescence or indifference is unlikely to constitute coercion or control. In my view, nothing which I stated in my reasoning in Friseal stands contrary to anything which the Full Court has stated in Pickford & Pickford [2024] FedCFamC1A 249 (“Pickford”) Further, the reasoning of the Full Court is entirely consistent with the proposition I put to Counsel for the ICL in these proceedings, namely that a finding of coercive or controlling conduct by an alleged perpetrator of family violence is one to be made on an objective basis and is not to be assessed purely on the subjective perception of the conduct on a purported victim. In short, coercive or controlling conduct only amounts to family violence under the Act if the conduct which dominates or causes a person to act contrary to their will, is objectively found to have that effect on the balance of probabilities. If it were otherwise, any truthfully given subjective evidence that a person was controlled or dominated by any conduct of another would constitute family violence. I cannot accept that to be the case and in my view is contrary to what is intended by the Act. I illustrate this proposition by extreme example. If a person with a mental health diagnosis which causes them to disassociate or suffer delusions from time to time, believes their partner is coercive or controlling because they repeatedly remove or hide the keys to the family car, it would be necessary to find objectively and on balance of probability that the keys were removed to deprive the person’s ability to drive as a means of controlling them in the home, rather than because there was objective concern that the keys would permit the person to drive and put themselves or a child at risk. This reasoning is entirely consistent with the reasons of Austin and Williams JJ in Pickford at [105] and [109], with which I agree. FINDINGS ABOUT RELEVANT CONSIDERATIONS Family violence including coercion or control The mother alleges that the father perpetrated family violence including by exercising coercion or control, to which the child was exposed. Her trial affidavit includes extensive evidence about these allegations at [311] to [389]. Overall, her evidence and that of the father[11] satisfied me that the parties had different likes and dislikes or preferences which caused discord and break down of the relationship. However, by her own evidence the mother states that she would pursue her own preference and likes either overtly or covertly, from which I infer that she was not dominated or controlled.[12] Many, but not all, of the detailed examples of behaviour to which the mother affirms in her trial affidavit demonstrate that the parties had different expectations or preferences about many aspects of daily life and their relationship. I am not satisfied that the father perpetrated any form of physical violence or coercion or control. Rather, I accept the evidence of Dr F[13] and the CCE,[14] and I find that: The mother disliked the father’s regimented, organised and obsessive traits and found them to be unacceptable which likely contributed to the relationship breaking down, but objectively the father’s conduct did not control or coerce the mother; The father’s regimented, organised and obsessive traits likely were tolerated by the mother until the parenting arrangements became contentious; and More recently, in the midst of the parenting dispute, the mother’s vulnerability, insecurity and fear of abandonment caused by her childhood experiences of inappropriate sexual abuse, have caused her to make allegations of coercion or control which are not objectively established. Further, the mother conceded that she told SASS that the father was supportive of her when in 2019 she accessed counselling about childhood sexual abuse. In the SASS records,[15] there is no suggestion at all that she found the father’s behaviours coercive or controlling. While she maintained in her oral evidence that the parties’ sexual relations were all at the father’s instigation and on his terms, this not borne out by the text messages exchanged between the parties which reflect mutuality.[16] The mother agreed that there was no risk to the child when he is in the father’s care and there is no evidence of family violence perpetrated against the child by either party. There is ample evidence of the parties engaging in conflict and verbal arguments and sometimes abuse post separation, also in the presence of the child. The video recording taken on 29 October 2021[17] is compelling evidence. It demonstrates that both parties had continued to engage in such conflict and argument, apparently unconcerned about the impact on the child of their conduct, as they persisted with it in a child-like manner, making tit-for-tat allegation and counter-allegation. The child can be heard to shout to the mother to leave, which I find demonstrates that he was aware of the conflict and was affected by it. The conduct and statements of the parties in the video amply demonstrate that they were each willing and able to go toe-to-toe, and that they mutually created conflict to the potential detriment of the child’s emotional well-being. I do not accept the submission made by the mother or ICL that the mother was controlled or coerced. The video was taken relatively soon after separation and so is likely to be indicative of the parties’ relationship dynamic, and it demonstrates both parties persistently demanding information of one another and being unreasonable and not child focussed. However, I attribute somewhat more criticism of the mother as she perpetuated the conflict by unreasonably refusing to leave the father’s then residence and unreasonably demanding to know what the father would be doing with the child. I attribute criticism to the father by continuing to film the incident and repeatedly asking the mother to leave rather than simply calling the police sooner, which would clearly have ended the impasse. The video is also telling in that it demonstrates the mother defiant, verbally articulate and completely at ease in the confrontation with the father. It is inconsistent with the manner in which she presented in the witness box. I agree with the submission of counsel for the ICL that the mother presented differently in the witness box, but I consider this is likely to be the result of her gaining insight and making necessary concessions in the face of the views of the CCE and Dr F, which she had clearly taken into account by the time she gave evidence. Notably, neither party presented as intimidated or fearful on the recording of this event and during cross-examination the mother admitted that she was not fearful at that time. The mother also conceded that she had told police that she did not consider the child at risk in the father’s care. Frankly, the parties engaged in one upmanship, were childish, and lacked insight. As I am not persuaded that the father perpetrated family violence (including coercion or control) in the relationship. I give this factor no weight in assessing what is in the best interests of the child. I agree with the formulation of the parties’ dynamics given by the CCE that each party has sought to pursue their own objectives due to acrimony at the time of and post-separation. However, in my view this does not constitute coercion or control as described by the authorities and legal principle referred to at [20] to [24] of these reasons.... ": Ward & Downs [2025] FedCFamC2F 154, [20]-[36] <https://austlii.edu.au/cgi-bin/viewdoc/au/cases/cth/FedCFamC2F/2025/154.html>. 

• *** "A significant aspect of this case was the alleged coercion or control exerted by the father towards the mother and children. The meaning of coercion or control is developing but has been addressed in authorities referred to by counsel for the mother in written closing submissions. In summary, the present principles that emerge are: (a) Coercion is defined as “to restrain or constrain by force, law or authority”, “to force or compel as to something” and “compel by forceable action”;[11] (b) Control is defined relevantly as “to exercise restraint or direction over” and “to dominate or command”;[12] (c) Although coercion or control is expressed disjunctively in the Act, the concepts are related and form part of an expanded concept of exercising power to restrain another or to cause another to act, by force, domination or command; (d) Where the result of conduct is an exercise of power by force, domination or command, it constitutes coercion or control and amounts to family violence under the Act;[13] (e) Coercion or control may encompass conduct that is not physical assault or violence, but mere assertion that the conduct is coercive or controlling does not make it so;[14] (f) Mere disagreement does not automatically equate to family violence and the disagreement must derive from, and be informed by, its form, intensity, context and impact on a person;[15] (g) The context in which conduct occurs is relevant to the assessment of whether there has been coercion or control.[16] Referring to this principle, I also consider the context in which statements are made to be relevant because restraint, direction or domination by force may be achieved by verbal interaction, including threatening statements; and (h) Intention on the part of the perpetrator is not a necessary component of family violence including coercion or control, but the conduct or statements must be designed to dominate or intended to control.[17] The notion of command or dominating influence, whether by physical or verbal means, that causes another to comply, act or agree contrary to their own will is at the core of coercion or control and amounts to family violence under the Act. Compliance that occurs due to ambivalence, acquiescence or indifference is unlikely to constitute coercion or control.": Friseal & Friseal [2025] FedCFamC2F 75, [25]-[27]. 

• "85 Turning then to consider the submissions critical of comments made by the primary judge during the Review hearing. It should firstly be observed that exchanges between counsel and the bench during contested hearings, sometimes even robust exchanges, are an important and necessary part of the judicial process.[7] On occasions, the judge may pose questions to clarify or challenge a submission or put to counsel an argument they anticipate the other side may raise so as to give counsel the opportunity to respond. It is to be hoped that counsel would prepare their clients for this process to allay any misconceptions that the questions posed are an attack on the case or a reliable indicator of how the judge will decide the case.  [7] Johnson v Johnson (No 3) (2000) 201 CLR 488. 86          The example provided by counsel for the mother set out above at [65] requires scrutiny. The relevant part of the transcript, while somewhat lengthy, is reproduced below: COUNSEL FOR THE MOTHER:        … At the very least, if your Honour doesn’t accept what I say is the pattern, and what the bench book says is a pattern available to the court in considering the dynamics of coercive control, if your Honour doesn’t engage with that or rejects that, in any event, what your Honour can find on the mere fact there was an AVO and criminal proceedings and a slap in the lead-up to it, is that this is an absolutely high conflict relationship. On either – HIS HONOUR:   Well, there’s no doubt, there’s no doubt, there’s no doubt about that because, circumstantially, it was, and it had a separation, not unusual that it was a conflictual one, it’s not unusual. Can I ask you a question, I mean, about coercive – and it’s a question, I’m not being facetious – COUNSEL FOR THE MOTHER:        Yes. HIS HONOUR:   – within this definition that you’re giving me that captures the material which you say would allow me to find that the father has perpetrated coercive and controlling violence, does the mother’s, I think unilateral relocation, but I might be wrong with that, but the mother’s unilateral decisions in respect of the children, enrolling them at a school some distance away and contrary to where there had been an agreement between the parents that the children would go to school, etcetera, does that constitute coercive control by the mother? COUNSEL FOR THE MOTHER:        No. That is entirely consistent with a mother seeking to create distance between herself and her abuser. So, your Honour would – HIS HONOUR:   Right. But it has the elements that you’ve just broadly defined, doesn’t it? COUNSEL FOR THE MOTHER:        No. The – HIS HONOUR:   It’s unilateral, denies the other party decision-making, etcetera, etcetera. COUNSEL FOR THE MOTHER:        No. HIS HONOUR:   So, why wouldn’t that be a fact of coercive and controlling behaviour? COUNSEL FOR THE MOTHER:        Firstly, your Honour, if one accepts that she was in a relationship where she was dominated by his family violence, both in direct form, but in the category of coercive control, if we say that that is her experience with the father, then it doesn’t follow that a person – and let’s be honest, the bench book says coercive control is a gendered dynamic, that is, it is very much more likely for it to be a female who is the victim of coercive control – so that is what the bench book says. HIS HONOUR:   It might say that, but in my experience on this bench – not this case, we might be digressing – I’ve seen instances of behaviour where facts can be found to the requisite standard of proof that would clearly fit within the definition of a female exerting coercive control over a male. So, I’m not sure about the – I’m not sure about the thrust of the bench book, if that’s what it says. COUNSEL FOR THE MOTHER:        Can I make it clear, I don’t say, and nor does the bench book say, that a person, namely a male, can’t be a victim of family violence. I accept that as a general proposition. HIS HONOUR:   Yes, all right. Anyway, look, I don’t want to digress. Again, I understand, I understand your point. And your point is that it’s open for me to find, on the balance of probabilities, that the mother has substantial and significant reasons to be fearful of the father because of a history of – with the emphasis on the coercive controlling and emotional part of family violence, with some physical stuff thrown in. That’s the thrust of your submission, isn’t it? COUNSEL FOR THE MOTHER:        It is the thrust of the submission, but I do want to grapple with your Honour’s question as to, well, isn’t the mother’s conduct also coercive control in the other way. Can I say – HIS HONOUR:   Well, I think, I think you’ve answered it. Go ahead, but I think you’ve answered it. Go ahead. COUNSEL FOR THE MOTHER:        Can I make it clear, if I haven’t already, if your Honour forms a view based on the corroborative evidence – and I will come to further aspects of corroborative evidence – but if your Honour forms a view that she was genuinely afraid of the father and intimidated by him, then that is different to coercive control. She is seeking to preserve her safety and that of the children, and she is, by virtue of being their mother, tasked, as she sees it, with protecting them. The worst thing for the children, if what she says is correct about the family violence, would be for her to remain in that scenario. So, she is fleeing, as opposed to making decisions which could be considered coercive control in the other direction. So, I make that clear. Now, importantly, your Honour, there’s two – HIS HONOUR:   I expect, I expect if we had an integer here of – added to the father’s behaviour that you’ve listed, and I’ve written down two pages worth of notes on it – if, at the time of the separation, he had taken the children, left the home, unilaterally enrolled the children in a school in Parramatta or somewhere, that you would say that that would be an instance of, another instance of his controlling behaviour? COUNSEL FOR THE MOTHER:        Save and unless, let’s just assume momentarily that he was in fear, let’s assume that he feared for his own safety and that of the children, then that could be a scenario where the father could have fled the family home, changed the children’s school, in circumstances where it wouldn’t be considered an aspect of coercive control. So, the difference is the rationale. HIS HONOUR:   Good answer, good answer. Okay. All right. (Transcript 26 November 2024, p.19 line 20 to p.21 line 19) 87          The above exchange demonstrates what regularly occurs between the bench and counsel. Submissions are tested. Assistance is sought from counsel in understanding concepts such as, in this case, coercive or controlling behaviour. The complexities and subtleties associated with such behaviour were recently discussed by this Court in Pickford & Pickford.[8] [8] [2024] FedCFamC1A 249. 88          In our view, the submission that the primary judge “went so far to suggest that the mother making a unilateral decision in enrolling them in a school in the [City H] area was an example of controlling and coercive violence on the part of the mother” (the mother’s Summary of Argument, paragraph 59), places an unfair and inaccurate gloss on the lengthy exchange between the primary judge and then counsel for the mother.": Bonhomme & Bonhomme [2025] FedCFamC1A 75.

[A-B] Coercion and Control, economic consequences of (in property contributions context, Kennon sense)

• "The wife alleged the husband engaged in behaviour that was coercive and controlling and made her life difficult both during the marriage and after separation. She relied on that behaviour to ground an argument that the contributions she made should be accorded more weight because the husband’s behaviour made the circumstances in which she made them, significantly more arduous than they ought to have been.[46] The wife deposed that, very early in the relationship when she was setting up a business, the husband helped her as she felt overwhelmed at everything required to start her own business. She said the husband helped her to set up the clinic and provided advice about how the business should be structured. She said that, over time, she let the husband make all of the financial and business decisions in a context in which she was the primary parent to the children and the primary income earner. She said this pragmatic division of labour became problematic when, over time, the husband became disparaging of her lack of knowledge of their finances and, during arguments, said things such as “Well, run your own business then”, which caused her to back down from the argument.[47] This implied threat to simply cease his financial management of the business was manipulative. Although denied by the husband, I accept the wife’s evidence about it because it was consistent with the volume of evidence of many other threats made in writing by the husband to both the wife and her solicitor, which I will come to. The wife said that, over time, she felt increasingly uncomfortable about the level of debt carried by the parties, including the purchase of the Suburb M property solely in her name when, at the same time, the husband insisted they had no money for other things, such as family holidays. During cross-examination it was put to the wife that the husband managing her financial affairs had been financially beneficial to her. The wife readily conceded that it had. She said the husband submitted her Business Activity Statements, submitted her tax returns and ensured bills were paid. She said he knew all of her bank login details and moved money around as it suited the family. However, she said there was a downside to that because, as part of refinancing loans at one point, the husband cancelled the wife’s credit card with the Commonwealth Bank and took out a new credit card with the National Australia Bank, making the wife an additional cardholder on his account which meant she did not have a credit card in her own name at the time of separation.[48] The husband said that, at the time of the refinancing, he explained to the wife that they would have to pay an additional annual fee of $395 for her to have her own credit card and that this seemed to be a waste of money given the parties’ finances were completely shared. I accept the husband’s evidence about this. It is common ground that, whenever the wife wanted to buy anything, she either used her secondary credit card attached to the husband’s credit account or took cash from the home safe. The fact that she had no detailed knowledge of the parties’ financial situation and no credit card of her own at separation arose from a relinquishment by the wife of the management of her own finances and pragmatism, rather than controlling behaviour, by the husband at the time. ... Family violence is defined in the Family Law Act 1975 as “violent, threatening or other behaviour by a person that coerces or controls a member of the person’s family... or causes [them] to be fearful”.[90] The evidence of the husband behaving in such a manner during the parties’ relationship is sparse. I am satisfied he was controlling of the wife when he threatened to suddenly stop managing her business finances during arguments and he was certainly abusive of her when he thought she had been scammed by charity door knockers but, otherwise, the evidence does not establish behaviour by him that would meet the statutory definition of family violence. However, I am well satisfied on the evidence that, at the time of the physical separation of the parties in January 2021 and continuing through to the time of the trial, the husband engaged in extensive coercive and controlling behaviour directed, ultimately, at the wife. This caused her to be anxious and fearful and made her financial and non-financial contributions over the two and a half years significantly more arduous than they would otherwise have been. ... Post-separation, the wife continued to carry a physical and cognitive load working full-time and caring for the children. She had to move out of the family home and twice get the children settled in a new home as the husband would not vacate the family home on a temporary basis, despite him spending significant time in Sydney. In addition, the wife had to cope with the behaviour of the husband which was bullying, harassing, threatening and obstructionist. He inappropriately involved third parties in the dispute, including the other directors of the O Clinic Unit Trust, the children’s school and the parties’ business bank manager. The wife had to keep dealing with these people or organisations and found the husband’s actions humiliating and distressing. In addition, the husband threatened legal and/or regulatory action against her, her friend, her solicitor and her work colleagues, and followed through with some of those threats. The wife’s post-separation contributions were made significantly more arduous than they ought to have been as a result of his behaviour. I have determined that there should be an adjustment to the wife of four percent of the value of the property pool in recognition of the greater parenting contributions made by her throughout the marriage and post-separation and the arduous circumstances in which she made her post-separation contributions.": Burnell & Rockford [2024] FedCFamC2F 468, [90]-[93], [158], [298]-[299] <https://austlii.edu.au/cgi-bin/viewdoc/au/cases/cth/FedCFamC2F/2024/468.html>. 

• Economic and financial, coercion or control, concerns notice issued to wife's solicitor - collateral pressure, husbands communications with agencies, banks, etc: "The wife alleged the husband engaged in behaviour that was coercive and controlling and made her life difficult both during the marriage and after separation. She relied on that behaviour to ground an argument that the contributions she made should be accorded more weight because the husband’s behaviour made the circumstances in which she made them, significantly more arduous than they ought to have been.[46] The wife deposed that, very early in the relationship when she was setting up a business, the husband helped her as she felt overwhelmed at everything required to start her own business. She said the husband helped her to set up the clinic and provided advice about how the business should be structured. She said that, over time, she let the husband make all of the financial and business decisions in a context in which she was the primary parent to the children and the primary income earner. She said this pragmatic division of labour became problematic when, over time, the husband became disparaging of her lack of knowledge of their finances and, during arguments, said things such as “Well, run your own business then”, which caused her to back down from the argument.[47] This implied threat to simply cease his financial management of the business was manipulative. Although denied by the husband, I accept the wife’s evidence about it because it was consistent with the volume of evidence of many other threats made in writing by the husband to both the wife and her solicitor, which I will come to. The wife said that, over time, she felt increasingly uncomfortable about the level of debt carried by the parties, including the purchase of the Suburb M property solely in her name when, at the same time, the husband insisted they had no money for other things, such as family holidays. During cross-examination it was put to the wife that the husband managing her financial affairs had been financially beneficial to her. The wife readily conceded that it had. She said the husband submitted her Business Activity Statements, submitted her tax returns and ensured bills were paid. She said he knew all of her bank login details and moved money around as it suited the family. However, she said there was a downside to that because, as part of refinancing loans at one point, the husband cancelled the wife’s credit card with the Commonwealth Bank and took out a new credit card with the National Australia Bank, making the wife an additional cardholder on his account which meant she did not have a credit card in her own name at the time of separation.[48] The husband said that, at the time of the refinancing, he explained to the wife that they would have to pay an additional annual fee of $395 for her to have her own credit card and that this seemed to be a waste of money given the parties’ finances were completely shared. I accept the husband’s evidence about this. It is common ground that, whenever the wife wanted to buy anything, she either used her secondary credit card attached to the husband’s credit account or took cash from the home safe. The fact that she had no detailed knowledge of the parties’ financial situation and no credit card of her own at separation arose from a relinquishment by the wife of the management of her own finances and pragmatism, rather than controlling behaviour, by the husband at the time. ... The wife described these two pieces of communication from the husband on 11 and 14 June as including “lies, blame and attempts to dictate any financial settlement”.[55] Objectively, this is not a fair characterisation of the communications.... The wife’s solicitors wrote to the husband on 6 November 2020 pointing out that his assertion the wife would be responsible for any loss on the sale was not accurate in law and that the manner in which he communicated to the wife about that amounted to duress and seemed designed to cause distress. They raised a number of other matters and asked him to nominate a mediator as he had suggested a mediator previously suggested by them would be biased in their favour. The solicitors included a draft balance sheet to try to progress the negotiations. ... The husband thereafter sent a volume of emails to the wife and her solicitor, accusing the wife and her friends of stealing particular items and refusing to accept an explanation of how he had misunderstood what he had observed remotely through the cameras. ... Much of the husband’s problematic behaviour manifested in controlling and, at times, abusive communication. He is a confident and verbose man. When faced with disagreement or resistance to a proposition he tends to talk at length, reiterate points and re-emphasising things he has already said in an effort to persuade the person disagreeing or resisting. This was repeatedly demonstrated in Court throughout the litigation. The wife has a more reflective and introverted personality. She said she tried to limit her communications with the husband because of the barrage of communication she received from him about any issue. When the proceedings commenced in April 2021, the wife sought particular interim parenting and property orders. When the husband filed his response in May 2021, he sought that the wife’s application simply be dismissed and that he have time with the children arranged around his work schedule. That would have meant non-stop negotiation between the parties, with the husband likely pressing his own perspective until he wore down the wife and achieved what he wanted. It would make it difficult for the wife to plan her own activities. That was clearly untenable for her. ... The husband agreed that, between May and September 2021, he sent at least three letters to the wife’s solicitors, insisting that the wife’s financial statement contained errors and that it should be refiled. He agreed that in his affidavit prepared for the September 2021 interim hearing, he was very critical of the wife’s management of her own financial affairs.[65] Under that pressure, the wife filed an amended financial statement but the amendments were very minor. In November 2022, the husband commenced defamation proceedings against the wife’s solicitor, based on a letter she wrote to the NAB in February 2022. The husband engaged senior counsel to draft the concerns notice. On the day the notice was served on the wife’s solicitors, the husband made a formal offer to settle the property proceedings. The husband denied he commenced the defamation proceedings to put collateral pressure on the wife in relation to the family law proceedings but, in the circumstances, his denial was not persuasive. ... Family violence is defined in the Family Law Act 1975 as “violent, threatening or other behaviour by a person that coerces or controls a member of the person’s family... or causes [them] to be fearful”.[90] The evidence of the husband behaving in such a manner during the parties’ relationship is sparse. I am satisfied he was controlling of the wife when he threatened to suddenly stop managing her business finances during arguments and he was certainly abusive of her when he thought she had been scammed by charity door knockers but, otherwise, the evidence does not establish behaviour by him that would meet the statutory definition of family violence. However, I am well satisfied on the evidence that, at the time of the physical separation of the parties in January 2021 and continuing through to the time of the trial, the husband engaged in extensive coercive and controlling behaviour directed, ultimately, at the wife. This caused her to be anxious and fearful and made her financial and non-financial contributions over the two and a half years significantly more arduous than they would otherwise have been. ... The husband’s conduct of the litigation also reflected poorly on him. He repeatedly tried to inflate the value of the assets the wife would take in the property settlement and to deflate the value of the assets he would take. He failed to make adequate disclosure and actively and repeatedly took steps which put collateral pressure on the wife in relation to the proceedings. ": Burnell & Rockford [2024] FedCFamC2F 468 [90]-[94], [100], [108], [116]-[118], [141], [158], [245]. See discussion in [90]-[158]. 

[A-C] State Courts: 'Coercive Control'

• "The Offender reported a manipulative, controlling and abusive relationship with the Co-offender. The Offender gave evidence that she had lived in over 20 different homes in 3 different States over the course of their relationship and marriage. She told Dr Mason that within 3 years after they met, the Co-offender took control of their finances; that he removed her bank card from her wallet, took her Centrelink money and only gave her a small stipend to pay for family items such as food; that when the Co-offender became bankrupt, he coerced her into putting her name down as the director of companies in which she had no involvement; and that he had manipulated her to give him money and to apply for loans in her name to help him, for which he would not repay her. She also stated in her affidavit that the Co-offender had taken all her money, sold her car and her jewellery, and once pawned all her belongings. She stated to Dr Mason that she had limited access to money and no control over her money throughout their relationship. The Offender reported to Dr Mason that the Co-offender would shout and scream at her and call her names, and this type of behaviour would occur on a daily basis. She described the Co-offender as an alcoholic, a significant gambler, and a compulsive liar. The Offender told Dr Mason that the Co-offender separated her from all her friends and family members and had physically assaulted her brother to whom she was particularly close. The Offender detailed in her affidavit a number of instances of abuse and controlling behaviour by the Co-offender. For example, she deposed that once, in 2012, the Co-offender had abused her mother. In the Offender’s brother's statement, he similarly records an incident in 1998 where the Co-offender bit the Offender’s mother's ear and head and hit the brother in the head, knocking him out. He also stated that the Co-offender had on many occasions borrowed money from himself and threatened to harm his son and his partner when Mr Hosking asked for the repayment of the money, and so far, the money has not been repaid. The Offender told Dr Mason that the Co-offender had never physically assaulted her, but he would kick her out of bed leading to her falling onto the floor. In the Offender’s affidavit, she also described an occasion where the Co-offender threw a phone at her head and that the Co-offender had numerous times threatened to leave her on the side of the road in the middle of nowhere out in the country. The Offender told Dr Mason that she was exposed to daily sexual abuse as her Co-offender would force her to send photos of her genital area to him and she had to carry out sexual acts to please him every day. She reported that her Co-offender would leave sexual photos of her genitals out for her children to see and this happened approximately 4 to 5 times per year, leading her to feel embarrassed, ashamed and humiliated and causing a significant impact on her children. The Offender in her affidavit described one occasion where she got arrested as the Co-offender had hired a car under her name and not returned it on the date it was supposed to be returned. A similar abusive familial relationship was described in the Offender’s sons' statements, which stated the Co-offender was verbally abusive towards every one of them and had treated the Offender in an abusive manner; that the Co-offender was a heavy drinker and would sometimes leave home for some period to drink or gamble without contacting them. The Offender’s younger son, Mr Fraser Gidley-Baird, states in his statement that the Co-offender had on many occasions stolen and sold their possessions or personal savings without their knowledge. The Offender’s elder son, Mr Fergus Gidley- Baird, states in his statement that he never saw his mother handle or deal with any of the Co-offender's finances. The Co-offender's half-sister, Ms Steedman, also described in her statement the Co-offender's heavy gambling behaviour and several events where the Co-offender had physically or verbally threatened the Offender, Ms Steedman herself or her children, including incidents in which the Co-offender threatened Ms Steedman and her friend with a gun; that the Co-offender threw knives at and attacked his own sister and Ms Steedman who at the time was pregnant; that the Co-offender borrowed money from her husband, refused to repay and threatened to harm her children. She also described in her statement events demonstrating the financial hardship the Offender was in during her relationship with the Co-offender. It was recorded in Ms Sawyer's 2024 report that the Offender’s children suffer significant mental health conditions. Her sons struggle with depression and anxiety conditions. I will return a little later in these remarks to the Offender's daughter's medical condition when I consider the issue of hardship to third parties that will arise should the Offender be sentenced to a term of imprisonment ... I have outlined at some length the evidence of the nature of the Offender’s relationship with the Co-offender. It was a relationship involving abuse and what is today termed, coercive control, over a number of years. It is a significant aspect of this sentence, in particular, given the evidence as to the control that the Co-offender exercised over the Offender during the period of the offending. ... I find that the Offender involved herself in the offence, to a considerable degree, because of the abusive and controlling nature of her relationship with the Co-offender and the conduct of the Co-offender towards her over a number of years. I consider that the relevance of those findings here is analogous to that of a finding of non-exculpatory duress. It is a matter that operates to mitigate the sentence, because it reduces the Offender’s moral culpability for the offence and to some degree, reduces the need to reflect the sentencing principle of general deterrence when imposing sentence. ...": R v Hosking [2025] NSWDC 187, [87]-[95], [124], [126].

[B] Family Violence

• Withholding a child: "15. The primary judge said at [23] that he had “taken into account the evidence of allegations of family violence”. The term “family violence” is defined in s 4AB(1) of the Act to mean “violent, threatening or other behaviour by a person that coerces or controls a member of the person’s family (the family member), or causes the family member to be fearful” (emphasis in original). Section 4AB(2) provides non-exclusive examples of behaviour that may constitute family violence. Section 4AB(3) provides that “a child is exposed to family violence if the child sees or hears family violence or otherwise experiences the effects of family violence” (emphasis in original). Section 4AB(4) provides non-exclusive examples of situations that may constitute a child being exposed to family violence. The issue of what constitutes family violence for the purposes of the Act was considered by the Full Court in Pickford & Pickford (2024) FLC 94-230, in separate judgments by McClelland DCJ, Aldridge and Carew JJ, and Austin and Williams JJ. However, the meaning of family violence, as statutorily defined or otherwise, was not in issue before the primary judge or on appeal. 16. In relation to the respondent’s allegations of family violence, the primary judge observed at [23] that there was “a good deal of animosity between the parents”. His Honour said that he was not satisfied, to the requisite standard of proof, of certain of the respondent’s allegations. However, his Honour was so satisfied in relation to other allegations of family violence, namely, “behaviour by a person that … controls a member of the person’s family” (s 4AB(1) of the Act), comprised of various instances of the father withholding the child from the mother (at [24]–[25]).": Aslett & Coren [2025] FedCFamC1A 92.

• Threats to withdraw visa sponsorship and send back to home country: "73. Nonetheless, the applicant has been consistent in his account since April 2019 that the sponsor, with support from her family, evicted him from the parties’ home on 15 August 2018 and threatened his safety. Threats were also made to withdraw the sponsorship of his Partner visa. While I do not accept that the applicant was subjected to much of the abuse he claims, including social isolation and financial abuse, his account of the incident on 15 August 2018 has been constant for more than five years. The sponsor’s decision to appoint the applicant as her Centrelink correspondence nominee and arrange for her Centrelink payments to be deposited into the parties’ joint account undermines the applicant’s claims that the sponsor was subjecting him to financial abuse. On the contrary, the sponsor gave him considerable access to, and control over, her finances. The applicant’s claims regarding social isolation were also not supported by any independent or reliable evidence. I accepted however that the sponsor and her family compelled the applicant to leave the parties’ home and threatened to send him back to India if he did not comply. I was satisfied that the applicant moved out of the parties’ [Suburb 3] home on 15 August 2018 because he genuinely feared for his safety and wellbeing. 74. Having considered all of the evidence before me, I was satisfied that for the purposes of reg 1.23, the applicant has suffered family violence committed by the sponsor that occurred whilst the parties were in the relationship. As such, the applicant is taken to have suffered family violence in the relevant sense: reg 1.22.": 1919097 (Migration) [2024] AATA 3001 (10 July 2024) <https://jade.io/article/1087850>. 

[C] Economic & Financial Abuse

• Allegation needs to be supported in detail: "102. During the hearing, the plaintiff referred to “domestic violence” and “financial abuse”. [56] To the extent that it might be suggested that the plaintiff had difficulties arising from domestic violence or financial abuse, I readily accept that there is some material before the Court which refer to those terms. [57] However, the evidence does not disclose in any detail the nature of the alleged violence. It does indicate that the allegations, or at least some of them, were disputed. [58] Indeed, in May 2019, by reason of the plaintiff’s uninvited contact with Dr Shah, his legal representative Mr Spencer foreshadowed that there may be personal violence orders sought against the plaintiff. [59] The plaintiff cross-examined Ms Ralston regarding her awareness of claims of domestic violence and financial abuse. Ms Ralston’s email of 9 August 2018 indicates she was aware of these allegations. [60] She confirmed that in cross-examination, though did not go so far as to accept that the allegations had been established. [61] 103. In any event, the plaintiff did not adduce any independent medical or other expert evidence suggestive that she had any particular vulnerability or “special disadvantage”.": Sanjiv v Coleman Greig Lawyers Pty Ltd [2025] NSWSC 528.

• Allegation, collateral pressure, arising from subpoena: "15. In relation to the subpoena addressed to J Pty Ltd, the husband also claimed the breadth of documents was unduly onerous and would require the director of J Pty Ltd (most probably the husband) to compile and produce the documents sought, causing financial hardship, and exacerbation of the alleged wife’s economic abuse of him.": Janvier & Domas (No 2) [2025] FedCFamC1F 83.

© Jing Zhi Wong, 2023-2025